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Are the '90s to be a decade marked by 
the return of humanism into feminist 
theory? So it seems with the emer- 
gence of books like Judith Grant's 
Fundamental Feminism, Julia 
Kristeva's invocation of Montesquieu 
in her Nations Without Nationalism, 
and frequent feminist use of the 
Habermasian oeuvre, reclaiming hu- 
manist aims from a normative sub- 
jectivity. Pauline Johnson adds to 
this growing movement with Femi- 
nism as Radical Humanism. While 
tracing the foundations of contem- 
porary feminist thought, Johnson 
does not so much advocate a rever- 
sion-to, but arecognition-of, the last- 
ing influences ofpost-Enlightenment 
humanism on feminist theory. 
A clearly written and systemati- 
cally constructed text, Feminism as 
Radical Humanism ~rovides  the 
groundwork for a detailed under- 
standing of contemporary feminist 
theory, contributing a careful exami- 
nation of humanism, while labour- 
ing to link humanist value commit- 
ments to the tenets of the current 
feminist project. Johnson rejects the 
assumption that a radical division 
between the two movements has ever 
existed, indicating that the reaction- 
ary stance embraced by many femi- 
nist thinkers is not only historically 
erroneous, but detrimental to the 
durability of feminist theory. For too 
long, Johnson claims, feminism has 
denied its lineage to humanist 
thought. Feminist and humanist as- 
pirations are not incompatible, but 
complementary; in her own words, 
"feminism is a humanism." 
At first glance, Johnson's thesis 
seems to border on the absurd. After 
all, have not some of the greatest 
feminist theorists struggled to repu- 
diate any possible link with the En- 
lightenment era? But Johnson's un- 
derstanding of humanism tempers 
any initial rejection of her thesis. She 
defines humanism as the first move- 
ment to put forth the universal prin- 
ciples of individual freedom, equal- 
ity, and self-determination, all of 
which have been adopted by current 
feminist thinkers. Furthermore, con- 
temporary humanism encompasses 
notions of freedom, rationality, and 
equality as hndamental aims, but 
these aspirations are now mitigated 
by a postmodern, processual subject, 
replacing the unified Cartesian cogito 
of earlier humanism; humankind is 
still defined in universal terms, but 
individual difference (religion, eth- 
nicity, gender) is now honoured, as 
the normative subject is displaced. 
Framed by Johnson's paradigm of 
humanism, feminism is delineated as 
only one more understanding of the 
humanist project, an elaboration of 
its principles and aspirations. 
Placing itself in opposition to hu- 
manism-an unvanquished rival- 
feminism fails to acknowledge that it 
is, in fact, the product, ~erhaps the 
progeny, of its opponent. Often 
uncritically embodying humanist 
universalizing tendencies, feminism 
is threatened precisely because of its 
refusal to acknowledge its post-En- 
lightenment roots. Johnson under- 
stands the polemic betweenfeminists 
ofequality andfeminists ofdifference as 
a controversy based on a misreading 
of the foundations of feminist theory. 
She somewhat optimistically con- 
tends that a new understanding of 
feminist history, based on humanist 
ideals, will erase the possibility for 
debate. 
Feminism's adoption of humanist 
principles, however, has not been 
entirely uncritical. Feminists, like 
contemporary humanists, have cor- 
rectly rejected the Enlightenment 
normative subject that erased diver- 
sity and plurality, constructing in its 
place a subject of difference that takes 
into account ethnicity and gender. A 
return to pragmatic humanist goals, 
coupled with this feminist subject of 
difference, will remove feminism 
from overly abstract, aesthetic, and 
textual debates and place it once again 
on the path of exploring and under- 
standing the lived experiences of 
everyday women. With this goal in 
mind, Johnson calls for a "post-meta- 
physical," radiral humanism: a move- 
ment that can affirm the history of 
feminism, allowing it to move for- 
ward imaginatively, rather than stag- 
nate in its current reactionary posi- 
tion. In Johnson's vision, feminism 
becomes the positive realization of 
the objectives of post-Enlightenment 
humanism. 
While Johnson correctly indicates 
that it is important for feminist theo- 
rists to acknowledge their humanist 
roots, it remains unclear why hu- 
manism should now appropriate, even 
subsume, feminist interests. Why is it 
necessary to set feminism within an 
established structure? Is humanism, 
wen in its radical form, seen as a 
more appropriate (less intimidating?) 
framework than feminism? Will radi- 
cal humanism be incorporated 
smoothly into the philosophical 
canon where feminism has been de- 
nied membership? Would this name 
change, perhaps unwittingly, serve 
another agenda? Furthermore, 
Johnson's critical understanding of 
humanism has transformed the origi- 
nal Enlightenment project to such a 
degree that it is almost unrecogniz- 
able in its new form. Her detailed and 
exhaustive revaluation of humanist 
precepts makes it even more difficult 
to comprehend the need for a return 
to this specific, historical movement, 
one that she has already critiqued so 
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well. Is it not time for women to face 
the fLture rather than gaze back in 
time, and create a specificallyjminist 
theory, indebted to, but not fettered 




Susan Purdie. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1993. 
by Susan Holbrook 
The juxtaposition of the title, Com- 
edy: The Mmte'y of Drjroutur, along- 
side a photograph of feminist per- 
formance artist Bobby Baker on the 
cover of Susan Purdie's book sug- 
gests that we are about to be offered, 
at least in part, an examination of 
how women negotiate and subvert 
the traditionally androcentric mode 
of comedy. This promise, however, 
proves false, as is illustrated most 
tellingly by the fact that Baker, while 
taking up a quarter of the space on 
the front cover, is relegated to a foot- 
note in the text. I was heartened 
(though, at first, perplexed) to learn 
that Purdie herself suggested featur- 
ing the Baker photograph; if a cover, 
for an author participating in its de- 
sign, marks a kind of end to a book's 
argument, then this first work's "last 
word" (or, in this case, last laugh) 
points perhaps to future work by 
Purdie that will involve a more thor- 
ough investigation of the practice 
and potential of feminist comedy. 
Theorizations of the comic have 
traditionally emerged from the mar- 
gins of a variety of disciplines, nota- 
bly literary criticism and psychology, 
and previous attempts to synthesize 
these works manifest themselves in 
the compartmentalized form of an- 
thologies such as Robert Corrigan's 
popular Comedy::McaningandForm, 
which offers selections by people like 
Susanne Langer, Sigmund Freud, and 
Charles Baudelaire. I commend 
Purdie's ambitious move to offer a 
new theory which is both substan- 
tially informed by these diverse texts 
and distinct from them, in its empha- 
sis on the "discursive exchange at the 
heart of joking." Similarly ambitious 
is her announcement, in the intro- 
duction, that she is "seeking a unify- 
ing threat that can be recognized, to 
some extent, whenever any element 
of funniness is identifiable in our 
response to anything." Puns, social 
exchanges, comic drama, physical 
comedy-all these are subsumed un- 
der Purdie's definition of "joking"; 
but while this radical "unifying" ges- 
ture is initially attractive, it precludes 
any focus on comic transgressions, 
which would threaten to rupture the 
norm Purdie seeks to define. 
Purdie draws on the theories of 
Saussure, Lhi-Strauss and, particu- 
larly, Lacan, to formulate a thesis 
which links joking, characterized as 
the successful operation of the "Law" 
of language, with the experience of 
full human agency. Jokes, she argues, 
in their performance of a "marked 
transgression" of the Symbolic Law, 
simultaneously perform its observ- 
. - 
ance. Purdie sets up a model of com- 
edy as political conservatism, posit- 
ing that "the formal confirmation of 
accepted discursive proprieties will 
tend to reinforce existing structures 
of exaltation and abjection." It is 
around the issue of the "abject," peo- 
ple discirninated against on the basis 
of race, gender, class, and sexuality, 
that I find some problems in Purdie's 
argument. She asserts that "all joking 
objects, the apparently 'low' as well as 
the evidently 'high,' are perceived as 
holding a power of some kind over 
the jokers, and it is funny when they 
are suddenly perceived as not having 
it." What are we to make, then, of 
Purdie's subsequent statement that 
the power of the black maid in a Tom 
andjerrycartoon is "inherently comic 
[because] it does not frighten us, so it 
is funny that the cat has to be afraid of 
her"? This example would seem to 
suggest that it is the production of 
threat, not its mitigation, which 
renders the woman of colour humor- 
ous. Such contradictions in Purdie's 
thesis locate the issues that beg more 
questioning and examination: how 
does comedy operate differentlywhen 
the audience member or the butt of 
the joke is not a white male? 
Furthermore, how do the "abject" 
joke? The word "transgression" re- 
curs in this book, but it is always 
clipped to the qualifier, "marked," so 
that Purdie presents transgression as 
necessarily translating into mainte- 
nance of the status quo. She invokes 
the S tallybrass and White text, Tram- 
grcssion, in order to align the political 
(non)effects of joking with those of 
carnival; both acts can be viewed as 
reinstating, through sanctioned in- 
version, the laws they breach. Tram- 
grcssion, however, ultimately details 
the real political efficacy of carnival, 
its tendency to incite riots, for exam-, 
ple. Acknowledging subversive po- 
tential in carnival, Purdie ends her 
comparative argument with the as- 
sertion that carnival and the comic 
diverge in this regard. Just when com- 
edy was getting interesting, Purdie 
takes the carnival out of it, ignoring 
Bakhtin's significant identification of 
"the basis of laughter which gives 
form to carnival." 
If Purdie were correct in her as- 
sumption that comedy tends to 
reinscribe existing power structures, 
then it would be in feminists' own 
interest to live out our mythical hu- 
mourlessness. While I value her in- 
vestigation of comedy's perils, she 
neglects to address the comics cur- 
rently forgingalternatives to conserva- 
tive humour; what about American 
Kate Clinton, who, along with her 
primarily lesbian audience, reaffirms 
a different world-view? The footnote 
opening with a reference to Bobby 
Baker does go on to posit perform- 
ance art as an alternative avenue, and 
Purdie notes that feminists have cho- 
sen to use it, though, she says, "not 
necessarily comically." Similarly, 
Purdie argues that a discourse of un- 
marked transgressions, as celebrated 
by Luce Irigiray and feminist theorist 
Regina Barreca, "would have noth- 
ing to do with definable'comedy.'" It 
becomes clear, in reading Purdie's 
book, that in order to allow for politi- 
cally transgressive comedy, we must 
allow for this mode's redefinition. 
Strangely, Purdie illustrates her 
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